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Disqualification of Counsel: The Westinghouse Litigation,
by Anthony D'Amato,* 61(no.2) Chicago Bar Record, 88, 90-94, 96, 98-101 (1979)
Abstract: The motion to disqualify counsel is becoming increasingly important in pre-trial strategy. Discusses
one case arising out of Westinghouse Electric Corporation's alleged breach of long-term uranium supply contracts,
in which a disqualification motion was sustained against Westinghouse's counsel, Kirkland & Ellis.

Tags: Disqualification of Counsel, Chinese Wall argument, Legal ethics, Westinghouse v. Rio Algom,
Westinghouse v. Getty, Westinghouse v. Kerr-McGee, Kirkland & Ellis
[pg88]** The motion to disqualify counsel is becoming increasingly important in pretrial strategy. “It can delay a trial, embarrass an opponent, and, if successful, deprive an
adversary of his chosen and well-prepared counsel.”FN1 In one of several gargantuan cases
arising out of Westinghouse Electric Corporation's alleged breach of long-term uranium supply
contracts, a disqualification motion was sustained against Westinghouse's counsel, Kirkland &
Ellis, a large two-city law firm numbering more than 130 lawyers in Chicago and about forty
lawyers in Washington D.C.FN2 In this particular case, Westinghouse as plaintiff was alleging
that twelve foreign and seventeen domestic corporations involved in the uranium industry
conspired in restraint of trade to raise worldwide uranium prices. Among the defendants were
four companies which moved to disqualify Kirkland; Gulf Oil Corporation, Kerr-McGee
Corporation and Getty Oil Company, on the ground that Kirkland was simultaneously acting as
their counsel by virtue of representing the American Petroleum Institute of which they were
members; and Noranda Mines Limited, on the ground that nine years previously
Kirkland had represented Noranda in several unrelated matters. Both the district court
(Judge Prentice H. Marshall) and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Fairchild, Sprecher and
Bauer, JJ) had little difficulty dismissing the latter motion by Noranda. But the court of appeals
reversed Judge Marshall's dismissal of the oil companies' motion, in effect disqualifying
Kirkland. (Westinghouse theoretically could have chosen to retain Kirkland and drop the three
oil companies from the list of defendants, but the other defendants would have then charged
that they were prejudiced by the dismissal of the oil company co-defendants.) Kirkland's
petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari was denied.FN3
Since it is unlikely that any well-established law firm would proceed on behalf of a
client knowing that it had an ethical problem in that representation, the result in the
Westinghouse case obviously must have taken Kirkland by surprise. The court's reasoning in
the case should therefore be of considerable interest to the practicing bar. There were three
important issues regarding the oil company defendants:
First, there was the apparent conflict in the positions that Kirkland was taking. In
representing the Petroleum Institute, Kirkland was arguing that oil companies' diversification
into uranium production was good for competition, whereas in representing [pg90]
Westinghouse against the oil companies, Kirkland was perforce arguing that the oil companies
participated in a cartel that stifled competition. Was Kirkland taking a contradictory stand and,
if so, what of it?
Second, Kirkland's Washington office was handling the Petroleum Institute, whereas the
Westinghouse antitrust action was being prepared by Kirkland's Chicago office. Could Kirkland
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argue that a large law firm may often find itself representing adverse interests and that therefore
what really matters is whether there has been actual communication between the two sets of
lawyers? Was it possible that in this case a “Chinese Wall” existed between the Washington
and Chicago offices of Kirkland, barring prejudicial communication between them?
Third, although Kirkland was concededly counsel for the Petroleum Institute, did that
representation “automatically create an attorney-client relationship” between Kirkland and the
8,000 odd members of the Petroleum Institute, three of whom were the oil companies seeking
Kirkland's disqualification?FN4 More broadly, can the requirement of confidentiality arise
when a law firm has not consented to be counsel for the movant (the three oil companies in this
case) and has not been retained by the movant?
Let us consider each of these three broad issue-areas.

Contradictory Positions
The oil companies seeking to disqualify Kirkland made much of the fact that in
representing the Petroleum Institute Kirkland was supporting a lobbying position which
encouraged oil company diversification into alternate energy sources such as uranium, since
thereby competition would be enhanced across all fronts—whereas in representing
Westinghouse at the same time Kirkland was contending that uranium producers, including the
oil companies, had conspired to destroy competition in uranium marketing and pricing. The
trial judge took prominent note of these “inconsistent positions” although he eventually held for
Kirkland,FN5 whereas the appellate court was not troubled by the inconsistency although in the
end it reversed the case and disqualified Kirkland.
On the particular issue of inconsistent advocacy positions, the appellate court's brushing
aside of the matter seems justifiable for two reasons. In the first place, contrary to Judge
Marshall's view of the matter at the trial level, the positions taken by Kirkland do not appear
inconsistent with each other. Oil company diversification into uranium production may or may
not promote competition with respect to uranium, but that issue is a general one, quite unrelated
to whether specific uranium producers—including oil companies that have branched into
uranium—have in fact engaged in a particular conspiracy to raise uranium prices and hold back
uranium supplies. Indeed, since most uranium producers are not also engaged in oil production,
it would appear to be hard, even theoretically, to relate oil company diversification plans to any
alleged cartel among uranium suppliers. This point will become relevant in another connection
later, when we consider the nature of [pg91] the confidential information that served as the
basis for Kirkland's disqualification.
Second, even if Kirkland were taking inconsistent positions on the merits of this or any
other issue, would there be any ethical consequences? Would there even be an “appearance of
professional impropriety” in the language of Canon 9 of the American Bar Association's Code
of Professional Responsibility? When a person says he believes one thing and then shortly
afterward says he believes the opposite, his listeners may be justified in thinking that he has
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lied at least once and maybe both times. But consider an attorney acting in his or her
professional capacity. In advocating a position, that attorney is definitely not saying that he or
she believes in that position, any more than a member of a college debate team is asserting his
or her personal belief on the assigned debate topic. For example, in representing a criminal
defendant known to the attorney to be guilty, the attorney clearly is not asserting his or her own
belief in the defendant's innocence. Of course, sometimes the public has to be reminded of this,
or “educated” about it. There have been several notorious cases in criminal history where a
particularly effective defense has led to the acquittal of a person who later admitted guilt; often
there was a public outcry about the “ethics” of the defense attorney for making such a
“persuasive” case to the jury. These cases at best serve as learning experiences for the public;
how else could every accused person be assured of defense counsel if counsel's personal beliefs
would serve as a disqualification? Similarly, a lawyer paid to advocate a position is simply
presenting an argument which the hearer can accept or reject on its merits and apart from the
personal beliefs of the advocate. In 1906 Louis Brandeis argued in behalf of United Shoe
Machinery Company that tying clauses were legal under the Sherman Act; a few years later,
having left United, he publicly argued with great fervor that such clauses were illegal under
existing law. Although he was highly [pg92] criticized for his “inconsistent positions” at the
time, the message he was really imparting to the public was this: Pay attention to the
arguments and not to who is making them, for what really counts is what you decide on the
merits; otherwise you are, in effect, delegating your own decision-making ability to the
spokesman who most impresses you with his apparent sincerity.

The “Chinese Wall”
On the assumption that Kirkland's Washington office received confidential information
from the oil companies in the course of representing the Petroleum Institute, should that
information be imputed to Kirkland's Chicago office, which was simultaneously preparing an
antitrust case against the oil companies? Judge Marshall's opinion at the district court level
cited Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York : “Since the largest firms represent
the largest corporations with interests in all sectors of the economy, it is almost impossible to
have an important client or its subsidiary avoid some kind of legal relationship with another
client at some time.”FN6 Judge Marshall found factually that no reported communication
passed between Kirkland's Washington and Chicago offices with respect to the oil companies.
Furthermore, he noted that affidavits filed in the case stated that no Petroleum Institute data
received by the Kirkland lawyers in Washington were ever disclosed to the attorneys for
Westinghouse in Chicago, and found that these affidavits “are sufficient to support a conclusion
that no disclosure of confidences occurred.”FN7 Of course, the judge noted, “An attorney
should not place himself in a position where he will or might be tempted to take advantage of
information derived from confidential interviews,”FN8 and hence found that Kirkland's
decision to represent Westinghouse against the oil companies was “an error in professional
judgment”FN9 and “a minor ethical grievance.”FN10 But he held that disqualification
of Kirkland would be “drastic, unjustified, and inequitable” in light of the “fairly remote”
possibility of improper professional conduct.FN11
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Clearly this “Chinese wall” argument relied upon by Kirkland at the trial level was
instrumental in persuading judge Marshall to deny the motion for disqualification, but in
winning the trial-level battle Kirkland might have lost the appellate-level war. For the “Chinese
Wall” argument was wide open to the damaging and archly phrased rebuttal by Getty Oil
Company on appeal: that Judge Marshall's decision was “nothing more than a holding that large
law firms in complex litigation will be held to a lower standard of ethics than will smaller firms
who act in simpler cases.”FN12 To add insult to injury, Getty continued with the telling
argument that even if the Chinese wall were intact up to the present moment, to allow Kirkland
to continue as Westinghouse's counsel was to invite the possibility that the wall could be
breached at any future point in the course of the Westinghouse litigation against the oil
companies. The court of appeals was, unsurprisingly, convinced. It held that there is no basis
for creating separate disqualification rules for large firms.”FN13
[pg94] Kirkland might have been well advised to forget the Chinese wall argument at
the trial level, even though the kinds of conflicts envisaged by Judge Weinstein (quoted above
by Judge Marshall were real and potentially damaging to large law firms. For at the most
fundamental level the attractiveness of a large law firm is its ability to bring its members' broad
and varied expertise to bear upon any individual client's problem. This is an obvious advantage
that even a two-person law partnership has over the solo practitioner. Any firm, whether
consisting of two partners or two hundred, is in effect holding out to the public a unified,
internally communicative resource group. Without such internal communication and pooling of
talents, there would be no public justification for a number of lawyers to hold themselves out as
a firm of lawyers. Thus Westinghouse, in hiring Kirkland to file its antitrust case, would even
have a right to expect that if Kirkland had some attorneys in Washington who were experts in
the oil-uranium field, these attorneys would be called upon to help in the litigation. (Of course
Westinghouse in fact might choose to waive that right, but in general the right is the same for
any person who engages a law firm as to any case.) If such rightful expectation makes it
difficult for a firm to grow bigger and bigger, if inevitable conflicts exert a pressure upon large
law firms to restrict their growth, and if such pressures occasionally result in disqualification
from a major case involving fees that could run into the millions of dollars, as presumably
occurred in the Westinghouse case for Kirkland—then such constraints will have to be
accepted. There is no ethical rule that suggests law firms should grow bigger and bigger, but
there is an ethical rule that suggests a client has the right to the undivided loyalty of all the
members of a firm—for the simple reason that this is what a law firm holds itself to provide.
Although Kirkland largely backed away from the Chinese wall argument on appeal, the
stress on that argument at the trial level and the trial judge's findings on the point inevitably
served to shape expectations at the appellate level. The case thus seemed to focus upon the
“confidential information” which, under the Chinese wall theory, was never imparted to the
Chicago office and which, under the next theory that we shall discuss, was or was not part of
the attorney-client relationship. What tended to get lost in the shuffle was the precise
relevance, even if disclosed, of the “confidential information” to the anti-trust case instituted by
Westinghouse. But since that matter was minimized, let us turn first to the theory of whether
an attorney-client relationship existed between Kirkland and the oil companies.
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Was There an Attorney-Client Relationship?
Kirkland's major contention on appeal was that it had no attorney-client relationship
with the oil companies seeking to disqualify Kirkland from the Westinghouse case. Therefore
Kirkland could breach no duty to them with respect to any information its Washington office
might have received in the course of representing the Petroleum Institute. To examine [pg95]
this contention, we must now delve in greater detail into the facts of the case.
Kirkland was retained in 1976 by the American Petroleum Institute to prepare
a report of legal arguments that could be used in API's lobbying efforts against legislative
proposals in Congress which were designed to break up oil companies by requiring divestiture
of their alternative energy resources, such as uranium and coal. Part of Kirkland's job was to
interview some of API's member companies, including the three movants in the instant case—
Gulf, Kerr-McGee and Getty. The Kirkland lawyers were introduced to the member companies
by a memorandum stating that Kirkland “is acting as an independent special counsel for API,
and will hold any company information in strict confidence, not to be disclosed to any other
company, or even to API, except in aggregated or such other form as will preclude identifying
the source company with its data.” Kirkland attorneys then interviewed Gulf and Kerr-McGee
officials personally and Getty by means of a written questionnaire only. Some of the questions
the attorneys prepared for discussion during the interviews (which were presumably asked
of the oil company officials) include the following:
Would your divestiture of alternative energy businesses violate any contractual
provisions of your loan or debenture agreements? Other contractual agreements? If so,
which?
Do you know of any oil or gas companies that have lower cost alternative
sources of energy that they are not developing?
Have the oil companies blocked coal liquefaction research?
Is the uranium industry competitive? Is that industry becoming more or less
competitive?
Are the oil companies aiding uranium production?
Have oil companies increased their holdings of uranium reserves faster than they
have increased uranium production?
Although Kirkland sent its legal bills to API and was compensated only by API,
affidavits submitted at the trial (quite after the fact, of course) stated that Gulf’s counsel in
Washington “was given to believe that the Kirkland firm was representing both API and Gulf,”
that Kerr-McGee’s vice-president understood a Kirkland partner to have explained that
Kirkland was working on behalf of API and also its members such as Kerr-McGee, and that
Getty's vice-president submitted data to Kirkland “upon the belief and expectation” that
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Kirkland needed the data “to render legal service to Getty in furtherance of Getty’s
interests.”FN14
Kirkland's final report to API was released on October 15, 1976, and, fortuitously or
not, on that same day Kirkland's Chicago’s office filed its anti-trust suit on behalf of
Westinghouse. The report to API contained 230 pages of text and 82 pages of exhibits.
It asserted, among other things, that the relatively high concentration ratios in the uranium
industry could be expected to decline, that current increases in uranium prices were a result of
increasing demand, that oil company entry into uranium production [pg96] had stimulated
competition and diminished concentration, that oil companies had no incentive to act in concert
to restrict coal or uranium production, and that the historical record refuted any charge that oil
companies had restricted uranium output. (Parenthetically, we might note that this report—on
its face, and especially the last clause of this summary—tends to support Kirkland's Chinese
wall theory, inasmuch as the preparers of the report in Kirkland's Washington office would
probably be surprised by the antitrust suit coming out of Chicago against the oil companies. )
Kirkland's argument that the above facts do not amount to a lawyer-client relationship
between Kirkland and the oil companies was based on a strict interpretation of the law of
agency. Kirkland did not consent to be the oil companies' attorney, submitted no bill to them,
and was not paid by them; and all the contemporaneous documents prepared in connection with
the API report stated that Kirkland was retained by API and made no reference to API members
as Kirkland's clients. But, as the court of appeals said, the trial court's acceptance of the
Kirkland argument applied a “narrow, formal agency approach to determining the attorneyclient relation.”FN15 Yet isn't the attorney-client relationship one of agency? The answer is that
it may be for certain purposes but one must be especially careful when a matter of legal ethics is
involved. When we have a matter of ethics or professional responsibility, a paramount
consideration must be that by definition the lay person seeking advice does not know what the
law is, and hence any lawyer talking with a lay person cannot reasonably expect to be shielded
by particularistic rules of agency (or any other area of law) which the lawyer knows but the
layman does not know. The very sensitivity of the attorney-client relationship requires a most
liberal interpretation of the boundaries of that relationship. Indeed, the boundaries extend well
beyond the precise relationship itself. For example, suppose a person walks into a law office
seeking advice and an attorney, after listening to his story, turns the case down. Then, even
though that person certainly is not a “client,” nevertheless what he has revealed to the attorney
is fully protected by attorney-client confidentiality.FN16 Kirkland tried unsuccessfully to argue
on appeal that Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (“A Lawyer Should Preserve
the Confidences and Secrets of a Client”) plainly applies only to the benefit of a present or
former client of the attorney.FN17 Clearly this would be a narrow, if not stultifying, view of
professional ethics, and it was properly rejected by the court of appeals.
As the court put it in the instant case, the attorney-client relationship can arise “when
the lay party submits confidential information to the law party with reasonable belief that the
latter is acting as the former's attorney”.FN18 In a sense the word “reasonable” begs the
question, for the Kirkland position might arguably be that it would be unreasonable in any case
to expect that the law party is one's attorney if nothing is said before or afterward about fees,
and indeed if the lay party has no [pg98] intention of paying the attorney. But apart from
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begging the question, Kirkland in fact argued that the oil companies were represented by top
executives as well as by their own legal counsel in the interviews, and they could hardly have
believed that Kirkland was acting as their attorney, Moreover, they were aware that Kirkland
was representing Westinghouse in matters growing out of the uranium supply contracts (though
not, of course, that Kirkland was preparing an antitrust suit on behalf of Westinghouse), and
this too should have put them on notice that Kirkland was not acting as their attorney, Finally,
in all the contemporaneous documents Westinghouse was referred to as “special counsel for
API”. How, then, could the court of appeals find that Kirkland was disqualified in the
Westinghouse antitrust case with respect to the defendant oil companies?
One line of attack was that API was simply an umbrella title for its members, who pay
all its costs including costs of counsel. But this approach would prove too much; it would mean
that Kirkland would find itself attorney for 350 major corporate and 7,500 individual members
in taking on API as a client. The result would be that API might find it impossible to hire any
moderately large law firm because of conflicts of interest that could arise. Although some cases
have held that each member of an unincorporated association is a client of the association's
lawyer,FN19 the court of appeals avoided resting its decision on this ground.
A second approach, which the court did adopt, was to find that a “fiduciary obligation or
an implied professional relation” existed between Kirkland and the oil companies on the basis
of the facts of the case.FN20 Note that the court was not labeling this a “lawyer-client
relationship.” Nevertheless the “implied professional relation” was sufficient to disqualify
Kirkland.
Apparently, the decisive factor from the court's standpoint was that Kirkland, in
soliciting confidences from API members came to them wearing its legal hat. “Kirkland did not
disavow its capacity as attorneys,” the court held, “but came expressly represented as lawyers.
FN21 But, then, is there no limit to this “implied professional relation”? The court said that the
relationship does not arise when one consults an attorney “in a capacity other than as an
attorney.”FN22 Yet, realistically, when does anyone—other than a personal friend—consult an
attorney in a capacity other than as an attorney? It would be very difficult for an attorney to
demonstrate that any advice he or she gives in the course of a business day is in a non-attorney
capacity. In other words, there are practically no bounds to the “implied professional relation”
with respect to the attorney's capacity as an attorney.
However, there is a second aspect to the “implied professional relation” test—the
receipt by an attorney of confidential information from the lay party. (The court talks about
“soliciting” confidences, but surely an unsolicited confidence can equally trigger the “implied
professional relation” test—as when a person tries to engage an attorney, the attorney says he
does not want to hear any more since he will not take the case, and yet the [pg99] person
persists in volunteering additional confidential information.) But the court's test, while not
impossibly broad, is potentially applicable in all cases in which confidential information was
received by an attorney. The potential for many disqualification motions in the wake of the
Westinghouse case is thus formidable indeed. Attorneys in all firms, large or small, will now be
on notice that an apparently harmless activity, such as the preparation of a report, could lead to
the receipt of confidential information, thereby disqualifying the firm from proceeding in
7

litigation against the sender of the confidential information. The very breadth of this danger of
disqualification, in light of the Westinghouse case, would suggest that future courts will narrow
its scope and refine its purpose.

Criticism
It would appear that the court in the Westinghouse case was largely taken in by
appearances. Clearly it was troubled by Kirkland coming on as an attorney and soliciting
confidences from the oil company defendants who were members of the Petroleum Institute,
then suing those same oil companies for antitrust violations. But appearances can be deceptive.
A criminal defense attorney may give a powerful summation statement to a jury on behalf of a
client he knows is guilty. If we went on the basis of appearances alone, we might say such
a lawyer was unethical. This and many other instances that could be mentioned indicate
that for resolving a matter of legal ethics we must look below the surface.FN23
Unfortunately, the court of appeals was not helped by the briefs of the parties. Kirkland
in particular submitted highly unsophisticated briefs in the case, focusing on narrow agency
rules for the determination of the lawyer-client relationship, relying on Chinese walls, and in
general treating a matter of ethics the same way one would treat a technicality in the Uniform
Commercial Code. To a large extent the substandard performances of many firms in cases
involving the Code of Professional Responsibility are due to the lack of any exposure to legal
ethics as a subject in law school. Now that legal ethics is becoming a more serious part of the
curriculum of the leading law schools, one would hope that future cases involving questions of
legal ethics will be better argued by attorneys and decided on more sophisticated grounds by
courts.
In the Westinghouse case what seems crucial is not that Kirkland received confidential
information from the oil companies, but rather the nature of the confidential information that
was received. Did the information relate at all to the antirust case? The report that Kirkland
filed on behalf of API certainly seems to suggest that the Kirkland attorneys in the Washington
office did not have the remotest idea that the oil companies might be involved in a cartel to
restrict the supply of uranium. Nor would it appear probable that the oil companies ever
disclosed any such information to the Kirkland attorneys; conspiracies in restraint of trade are
not blurted out to any stranger who walks in the door. If anything, one might reasonably
suppose that the oil companies went out of their way to [pg100] “sell” the Kirkland attorneys
on how much competition was being fostered by their involvement in uranium production. It
would appear that nothing that Kirkland received from the oil companies, whether confidential
or not, had any bearing on the antitrust case. If this conclusion is correct, then the “'implied
professional relation” the court talked about should not count toward disqualifying Kirkland
from this case (even though it might count toward disqualifying Kirkland from some other
case against the oil companies, where the information received was relevant to that other case)
FN24
But suppose for the moment that one of the oil company executives said to a Kirkland
partner during one of the API interviews, “You might be amused to know that we're engaged
8

in a cartel to restrict the supply of uranium—this is off the record, of course.” Since we have no
knowledge that some such statement was not made to a Kirkland lawyer, then perhaps what
might have been said in the interviews was relevant, after all, to the Westinghouse case.
However, this supposition is so improbable as to deserve no weight in the motion for
disqualification—not only because the oil company officer, by making it, could be admitting a
continuing criminal course of conduct, but also because Kirkland could reasonably suppose
that the oil company counsel would have had to resign rather than participate as house counsel
in an illegal course of corporate conduct. Indeed the Kirkland attorneys, if they heard any such
statement, might themselves not be bound to hold that statement confidential because
it involves a continuing crime.FN25 Thus, the very statement that theoretically would prove
relevance of the confidence to the Westinghouse antitrust case is one on which a good
argument can be made under the Code of Professional Responsibility that it is inherently not
confidential!
Accordingly, if we dissociate the “confidential information” received by Kirkland from
any use in the Westinghouse antitrust case, we are left with no substantive reason to disqualify
Kirkland. In the same litigation the court of appeals did not sustain a motion by Noranda
Mines Limited to disqualify Kirkland on the ground that Kirkland had represented Noranda
nine years earlier on a different situation. But surely it is not the passage of time that is
significant. Rather, the significance lies in the fact that Kirkland's representation of Noranda
was on a clearly distinguishable situation. Similarly, as to the oil companies, the court of
appeals could have found that although there was no time gap and although “uranium”
was one of the matters that Kirkland investigated for API, nevertheless there was no
relationship between information received by Kirkland for API and the issues in the antitrust
litigation. On that analysis the court should have held that Kirkland did nothing that was even
remotely unethical in representing Westinghouse against the oil companies.
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